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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to study the economic history of crises in Argentina. Following 
Prebisch´s conjecture, we look for regularities in the behavior of key macroeconomic variables 
in the neighborhood of the crises. We perform parametric and non-parametric analysis in order 
to determine whether the Argentinean crises respond to the predictions of first, second or third 
generation models.  
Firstly, we identify crises episodes throughout the Argentine history from 1885 to the present. 
We apply the Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994) methodology to sort crises from non-
crises periods, and we distinguish among deep crises (crashes), mild crises and turbulent 
episodes. Secondly, we split the sample in crises and non-crises years and carried out 
graphical analysis, and not parametric tests in order to establish weather key macroeconomic 
variables, namely public expenditure, GDP, external debt, exports, imports and the current 
account deficit change significantly before, during and after crises. We report the two-sample 
Kolmogorv-Smirnov test of equality of distributions and the Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of 
population.  
Since the previous studies are intrinsically univariate, we also performed a regression analysis, 
estimating a logit model. It is found that fiscal variables have an important role in determining 
the probability of crisis. The domestic macroeconomic effects, measured by GDP growth and 
real M3 growth are also very strong. An appreciation of the currency (lagged once) also 
increases the probability of a crisis. We can also see that an impairing of external conditions 
make a crisis more probable. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: E3, N20 
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La crisis actual es la misma de 1870, la de 1865, la de 1860, de la 1852, de la 1840, etc. 
El país ha vivido en esas crisis desde que dejó de ser colonia de España. Podría decirse 
que no es económica sino política y social. Reside en la falta de cohesión y de unidad 
orgánica del cuerpo o agregado social que se denomina Nación Argentina, y no es sino 
un plan, un desideratum de nación. La diversidad y lucha de sus instituciones de crédito, 
la anarquía de sus monedas, la emulación enfermiza que preside a sus gastos 
dispendiosos en obras concebidas para ganar sufragios y poder, vienen del estado de 
descomposición y desarreglo en que se mantienen las instituciones, los poderes, los 
intereses del país. 
Juan Bautista Alberdi 
Escritos Póstumos. Estudios Económicos. Tomo I. 
 
En la historia monetaria argentina, a pesar de su confusa apariencia, nótese una serie 
de períodos de ilimitada confianza y prosperidad, de expansión en las transacciones, de 
especulación inmobiliaria y fantasía financiera, seguidos de colapsos más o menos 
intensos, precipitados en pánicos que originan la liquidación forzada de las operaciones, 
el relajamiento de la confianza, la postración y el estancamiento de los negocios. Sin 
duda, cada uno de estos ciclos no se presentan exactamente en las mismas 
condiciones, ni con idéntico carácter, pero, considerados en conjunto, es posible 
encontrar en ellos, hechos fundamentales que se repiten, cuyo análisis permite formular 
síntesis acerca de su evolución..... buscaremos demostrar que en nuestras crisis, aparte 
de las diferencias de menor cuantía, interviene un factor fundamental, ...y peculiar al 
grado de formación histórica del país.  
Raúl Prebisch  
Anotaciones sobre nuestro medio circulante (1921) 
 
En los últimos 15 años, la Argentina ha gastado mucho más de lo que producía, 
omitiendo reponer las inversiones básicas de capital y endeudándose fuertemente en el 
exterior. ... Más del 80% de los ingresos del Estado se va en sueldos, y ello explica que 
no haya dinero para hacer viviendas, ni caminos, ni escuelas, ni siquiera para reparar 
pavimentos o dar más luz a nuestras obscuras calles... La Argentina ha estado viviendo 
una ficción económica, cuyas consecuencias están claramente a la vista...Todos los 
gobiernos han coincidido en la necesidad de reducir los elencos administrativos y las 
crecientes pérdidas de los servicios públicos, pero año tras año, esos gastos y esas 
pérdidas han ido en aumento ... 
Arturo Frondizi  
Radio Speech to the People of Argentina.  
Memoria Anual 1958, Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
                                              
* We thank Horacio Aguirre, Luis Manuel Cordomí, Víctor Elías, Saúl Lizondo and José Pineda for helpful comments 
to earlier versions of this paper and Juan Dip and Santiago Ruiz Nicolini for their research assistance. All remaining 
errors are ours. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Consejo de Investigaciones de la Universidad 
Nacional de Tucumán (CIUNT) Grant 26/F 204. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the CIUNT. 
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I.  INT RO DUC TI ON  
Social sciences researchers faced to the Argentinean economic history for the first time, usually 
get surprised by the repetitiveness in economic episodes1. Those that deepen the study get 
absolutely astonished. Some economic events, like crises, seem to come and go over and over 
again. As sustained by former central banker Raúl Prebisch, more than 80 years ago (see 
quotation), characters may change, characteristics might be different but some fundamental 
facts can be traced throughout history. Why crises are so frequent and of such large 
magnitude? What are these crises caused by? Do they always recognize the same causes? 
Which are those “fundamentals” named by Prebish? Juan Bautista Alberdi and Arturo Frondizi, 
from different centuries and positions, blamed the irresponsible fiscal policy for the ever-
returning crisis in the country (see quotation). However, external factors and expectations about 
the sustainability of economic policy might have played a role in the crises.  
Case studies focused on particular crisis, like della Paolera and Taylor (1999, 2000) that 
analyze the 1929-32 crisis, seem to confirm the importance of the fiscal link in the crisis, 
although they stress too other factors like poor regulated financial sector and adverse external 
conditions. Similar conclusions can be drawn from numerous papers that study more recent 
crises (See Dornbusch, 1984; Cumby and van Wijnbergen, 1989; Kehoe, 2003; and Veigel, 
2004).  
The objective of this paper is to study the economic history of crises in Argentina. Following 
Prebisch´s conjecture, we look for regularities in the behavior of key macroeconomic variables 
in the neighborhood of the crises. We perform parametric and non-parametric analysis in order 
to determine whether the Argentinean crises respond to the predictions of first, second or third 
generation models.  
Firstly, we identify crises episodes throughout the Argentine history from 1885 to the present. 
We apply the Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994) methodology to sort crises from non-
crises periods, and we distinguish among deep crises (crashes), mild crises and turbulent 
episodes. As far as we know, there are no comprehensive studies on argentine crises for long 
periods of time, covering the XIX and XX century as well as the present23. 
                                              
1 Excessiveness is also an outstanding feature of Argentina’s economic life. Periods of euphoria and unlimited 
enthusiasm are followed by frustration and endless delusion without any transition time (see Prebish’s quotation) 
2 Studies like those of the Bordo and Vegh (1998) and Saxton (2003) cover long periods of  time but their emphasis is 
different from ours. 
3 In a previous paper (Cerro and Meloni, 2003) we analyze the economic crises from 1823 to the present. 
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Secondly, we split the sample in crises and non-crises years and carried out graphical analysis, 
and not parametric tests in order to establish weather key macroeconomic variables, namely 
public expenditure, GDP, external debt, exports, imports and the current account deficit change 
significantly before, during and after crises. We report the two-sample Kolmogorv-Smirnov test 
of equality of distributions and the Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of population.  
Since the previous studies are intrinsically univariate, we also performed a regression analysis, 
estimating a logit model. The analysis of the macroeconomic variables in the neighborhood of 
the crises also helps us to test the validity of Alberdi’s hypothesis as well as determine whether 
they respond to the predictions of the first or second-generation models of currency crises. This 
is particularly important since policy prescriptions are different depending on the type of crisis 
faced by the country.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II sketches some theoretical issues 
on BOP crises. In Section III we construct a market turbulence index for the 1823 – 2002 period 
that allows us to identify crises episodes and classify them as deep, mild and minor turbulence. 
Section IV describes the behavior of macroeconomic variables in the neighborhood of the crisis 
and the historical context of each crisis. Section V explains the results obtained from the non-
parametric tests carried out. Finally, section VI presents some conclusions, conjectures and 
guidelines for further research. 
I I.  T HE ORE TI CA L BAC KGR OUN D  
Since Krugman (1979) developed the first canonical model of currency crisis, a great deal of 
theoretical and empirical literature has surged. Most of the theoretical literature was concerned 
with the conditions a crisis should fulfilled in order to be considered first, second and/or third 
generation crisis, while most of the empirical studies tried to identify crises across countries 
according to this classification.  
F IR ST  G ENE RA TI ON MO DEL S 
Krugman’s seminal paper (1979) showed how inconsistencies between domestic economic 
conditions and the exchange rate commitment led to the collapse of the currency peg. In his 
paper, budget deficit fully monetized was financed by Central Bank expending reserves. When 
such reserves fell to a critical threshold a speculative attack was launched, causing reserves 
depletion and the abandon of the exchange rate peg.  
The canonical crisis model stemmed from a work done by Salant and Henderson (1970) on the 
stabilization of commodity prices. In international markets, such stabilization would take place 
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through the operation of international agencies buying and selling commodities. On theoretical 
grounds, such scheme would be subject to important speculative attacks. The underlying logic 
of the model described by Salant and Henderson was taken by Krugman, and refined by Flood 
and Garber (1984), to explain central banks attempts to stabilize the exchange rate.  
In the canonical currency crisis model, currency crises are the result of the fundamental 
inconsistency between domestic policies –generally the persistence money-financed budget 
deficit- and the attempt to fix the exchange rate. This inconsistency may be sustained while 
Central Bank has sufficiently large amount of reserves, but when reserves reach enough low 
level, speculators force currency crises. 
Since government fixes the exchange rate, investors wish to hold domestic and foreign assets 
in fixed proportions. They rebalance their portfolio by exchanging domestic for foreign reserves 
of the central bank, since there is no internal mechanism to get rid of the excess money supply. 
If speculators were to wait until financing the deficit depletes reserves, they would realize that 
holding foreign exchange is more attractive than domestic currency, leading to a jump in the 
exchange rate. But since agents are rational, no jump is possible, so they would sell domestic 
currency before the depletion of reserves, leading speculator to sell even earlier. The 
speculative attack takes place when the shadow price of exchange rates (the price that would 
prevail after the speculative attack takes place) equals the exchange rate. At that moment 
reserves are driven to zero forcing the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate, and the 
economy switches to a floating rate regime. With reserves depleted, budget deficit is financed 
by money creation, which in turn causes an increase in inflation rate.  
Two important aspects of this model should be highlighted: the first one is that many 
economies reflect a basic inconsistency between fiscal policy and exchange rate regime. In this 
framework, speculative attacks are not only possible, but also inevitable. The time in which it 
will take place is perfectly known forehand, so nobody is taken by surprise. Secondly, even 
attacks may appear arbitrary and capricious, they can occur in a world where all speculators 
are completely rational. Rational economic behavior, characterized by smoothly evolution over 
time, can be associated with dramatic attacks and changes in the exchange rate regimes. 
A considerable literature has developed in recent years that has amended or extended the 
original model. As already mentioned, Flood and Garber (1984) derive explicitly a solution for 
the time of collapse in a fixed exchange rate regime. Recently, Agenor, Bhandari and Flood 
(1992) surveys currency crisis literature extensions in various directions. 
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SEC OND -GE NE RAT IO N MOD EL S 
After the canonical crisis model failed to explain the European Monetary System crises (1992-
1993), new generations of crisis models arose. The so– called second generation models 
developed by Flood and Garber (1984b) and Obstfeld (1986, 1994) focused on government 
comparison of the net benefits from changing the exchange rate versus defending it.  
The new generation models are based on the existence of multiple equilibria. When investors, 
while not questioning that currency policy may be consistent with the currency peg, they 
anticipate that a successful attack will alter policy, so it is expected future fundamentals, 
conditional on an attack’s taking place, which are incompatible with the peg. In this case 
government might defend the currency, but the costs (high interest rate, high unemployment 
rate) can be so high that government finally devaluates, so market anticipate that action and 
acts in advance. 
The government has so many good reasons to abandon the fixed exchange rate as to defend 
it. But the cost of defending a fixed exchange rate increases when people expect that the 
regime will be abandoned. 
There might be several reasons why government wishes to abandon fixed exchange rate. For 
example, if government has a large debt burden denominated in domestic currency, 
devaluation would evaporate part of the debt. Or, if the country is suffering high unemployment 
rates, and nominal wages are rigid, devaluation would diminish real wages. 
If government has reasons to devaluate, why it would defend fixed exchange rate? One reason 
in inflation-prone countries is that a nominal anchor is a guarantee against high inflation rates. It 
is also argued that a fixed exchange rate facilitates investment and international trade. Finally it 
might be considered as a strong commitment to international  cooperation  (the case of Sweden 
in 1992) 
Models of self -fulfilling attacks imply that good fundamentals may not suffice to avert currency 
crisis. The state of fundamentals determines the existence and multiplicity of attack equilibrium. 
In Krugman’s model fundamentals may be consistent with exchange rate or not. In second 
generation models the same is true for extreme values of fundamentals, but there’s also a large 
middle ground over which fundamentals are neither so strong as to make crises inevitable nor 
so weak as to make an attack impossible. An important difference between this two models is 
that in the first you can anticipate the moment of the depletion of reserves, while in the second 
the timing is undetermined, so it can happens unexpectedly, and that is what it makes them so 
dangerous. 
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T HI RD  GE NE RAT I ON MOD EL S 
The standard explanation for speculative attacks had serious shortcoming when applied to the 
recent Southeast Asian currency crisis in 1997. The conventional currency crisis theory 
associated with inconsistency in present or future fundamentals missed important aspects in 
the Asian crisis.  
Every crisis is different, but the Asian crises seem to differ from the standard theory in several 
fundamental ways. We are specifically referring to the role played by financial intermediaries 
whose liabilities were perceived to have government guarantee, but were essentially 
unregulated and therefore subject to moral hazard problems.  
In first generation model a la Krugman the collapse is inevitable and is the result of an over 
expansive fiscal policy, which is inconsistent with the monetary policy. In second generation 
models, crisis are the result of the predicted impair in fundamentals, or purely the result of self 
fulfilling prophecy. 
Despite every crisis is different, Asian crises differed from traditional crisis in many ways as 
Krugman (1998) points out. First, none of the fundamentals that led to crises a la Krugman 
were present in the Asian economies. Second, Asian economies did not face severe 
unemployment when the crisis begun, nor had any incentive to abandon the peg to carry out 
expansive monetary policy. Third, in all countries were present a boom-bust cycle in the asset 
markets. Finally financial intermediaries had a central role in the crisis. A mismatch in the 
deposits of the banking and non-banking system was present: the institutions borrowed short 
term money, often in foreign currency, and lent that money in long term domestic currency.  
The evidence seems to suggest that Asian crisis was neither the consequence of fiscal 
imbalances, nor were the incentives to follow an expansive monetary policy, but were the 
problems with financial intermediaries that drove the crisis. The excessive risk lending led to 
inflation in the asset prices. When the crisis burst, the asset prices fall, the insolvency of 
intermediaries were visible, forcing them to cease operations, which in turn implied further 
deflation in asset prices.  
III EM P I RI CAL  LI TE RAT URE  
With the standard first generation models, crisis should have a significant predictable 
component. Previous to the speculative attack we should observe an expansive fiscal and 
monetary policy, and a decline in international reserves for long periods.  
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On the other hand, second generation models imply that speculative attacks should be followed 
by expansive monetary and fiscal policies. 
Third generation models emphasize in the role played by financial intermediaries, so they 
analyze variables related to them, such as the liquidity coefficient, solvency of the financial 
sector, external debt maturity, and assets denomination versus liabilities. 
Blanco and Garber (1986) using a variant of Krugman-Flood and Garber model, find important 
insight related to the behavior of macro variables previous, during and after the crisis. It 
predicts that we should not only observe fiscal deficit, but also growing quantity of money, 
wages, real exchange rate appreciation, impairing in current account deficit and in the trade 
balance and an increase in the domestic rate of interest. This work was extended by Goldberg 
(1993) and by Cumby and van Wijnbergen (1989) for the crawling peg experience in Argentina 
during the 80's.  
These papers focused on specific events and on particular countries. Later studies 
concentrated upon cross-countries crisis episodes. For example Edwards (1989) studies 39 
devaluation in emerging countries during 1962 -1983. 
The speculative attack during the 90's challenged the view of researchers that crises respond 
to irresponsible fiscal and monetary policy. Empirical papers tried to understand the origins of 
these crises. They studied the behavior of macro and financial variables during crisis episodes 
and compared with tranquil periods. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Sachs, Tornell 
and Velasco (1996), and Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) followed this line of research.  
The severe crisis in Southeast Asian countries (1997), opened a new branch of investigation. 
Most papers tried to emphasize in the role of financial variables to explain crises.  For example 
McKinnon and Pill (1998) compare the Southeast Asian crises with the episodes in Mexico and 
Chile, finding important similarities but they point out that the Asian episodes were exacerbated 
by the unhedged foreign exchange position of Asian banks. 
Recent currency crises raised questions related to the predictability of currency crises. Many 
empirical works attempt to build early warnings using macro and financial variables, as is the 
case of Lizondo, Kaminsky and Reinhart(1998) 
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IV  IDEN TI FY I NG CU RRE NCY  CRI SE S 
There is not a unique definition of currency crisis, however most economists would agreed that 
a currency crisis is an speculative attack against currency that ends up in a devaluation if the 
attack is successful. However authorities may ward off the attack by losing huge amount of 
foreign reserves and/or by increasing the rate of interest. 
One of the key questions to be solved in the analysis of crisis is how to identify speculative 
attack in foreign exchange rate, and to settle under what circumstances the movement in these 
indicators represents a crisis. The following issues arise: Should currency crisis be limited to 
exchange rate devaluation, how large a movement must be to be considered a crisis, and in 
high inflation periods, how large a devaluation must be to qualify for a crisis.  
Frankel and Rose (1996) construct the most obvious indicator of crises: changes in the nominal 
exchange rate, on the grounds that foreign reserve data contains a lot of noise, and few 
countries have market-determined short-term interest rates. They also point out that if 
speculative attack is successful, it ends up in currency devaluation, and that is the case in most 
emerging countries.  
Some researchers have proposed indexes that weight different components of speculative 
attack. However in some cases they are not easy to construct, as is the case in Girton and 
Roper (1979) 
Eichengreen  et al (1994) propose a weighted index of speculative attack component weighting 
by the inverse of the variability of each component to ensure that the units are comparable. 
They include in the currency crisis definition changes in the exchange rate, in the international 
reserves and in the interest rates. As Moreno and Trehan (2000) point out there is an implicit 
assumption in this approach that a one standard deviation change in the interest rate 
represents as much of a currency crisis as a one standard deviation change in exchange rates 
or reserves. Many researchers followed a similar methodology. For example Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) construct a similar index, but they exclude interest rate on the ground that it is 
not consistently available for the whole sample they use.   
The second issue relates to how big a movement in the index should be to be considered a 
speculative attack. There are also different criteria. Frankel and Rose (1996) use an absolute 
cutoff. Most researchers, however, use moments of the distribution (mean plus times a 
standard deviation) to determine crisis. Some of them use the moments of the distribution of 
the index (for example Eichengreen et al (1994), Reinhart and Kaminsky (1999)), while others 
use the moments of the component of the index (Moreno 1995).  
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In high inflation episodes, rates of depreciation are consequently high. To ensure we do not 
consider each of these deprecations as an independent crisis, it is necessary to compute 
separate standard deviations for those periods. As pointed our by Reinhart and Kaminsky 
(1999), if standard deviation is computed for the full sample, too many crises may be identified 
during inflationary episodes. 
From the discussion we see that no measure of currency crises is perfect, they all have pros 
and cons, and there are always elements of arbitrariness.  
 In this study we focus on Argentines crisis for the period 1885-2003. We opted for an index 
similar to the one proposed by Eichengreen et al (1994) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)4, to 
capture episodes like Tequila, where authorities managed to keep the peg, despite the lose in 
reserves and the increase in interest rate, as we are interested in all speculative attack, 
successful or not. Afterwards and in according to the value of the index, we will classify the 
episodes as deep, mild and turbulent crisis. 
The index stems from the idea that market pressure increases when exchange rate devaluates 
(rises), when interest rates increase and when international reserves fall. Under a floating 
exchange rate regime, we expect abrupt increases in the exchange rate as crisis develops, 
while under a fixed exchange rate, prior to devaluation, interest rates increase and international 
reserves diminish. 
We use the rate of change of nominal interest rate rather than the difference between the 
domestic and international rate, as in other papers, due to the inflationary process Argentina 
went through during the centuries. These inflationary processes implied high and volatile rate of 
interest, and given the relative constancy of the international rate, the difference between 
domestic and international rate proved to be meaningless to capture turbulent periods, so the 
rate of change is a better definition. The Market Turbulent Index (MTI) is: 
 
 
                                              
4 We also included the rate of interest in the index but not for the whole period since this series is not available 
monthly  
sss iRe
iRe
MTI
ˆˆˆ +-=
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Where the symbol Ù represents the growth rate of the variable, e is the exchange rate, R stands 
for international reserves, i is the domestic interest rate and se, sR, si are the standard 
deviations of the growth rate of the exchange rate, international reserves and domestic interest 
rate, respectively. 
The Index is weighted by the inverse of the respective standard deviation to avoid the most 
variable component dominates the index movements. However, we also used different weights 
to test the robustness of the index, and the crisis determination proved to be quite robust to 
different weight specifications.  
The index was computed with monthly data from 1914 to 20025. We imposed different criteria 
to sort crises, but whenever the MTI is greater than the mean plus k standard deviation we 
identify a “signal” or “turbulent episode”.  
We require at least two “close” months with MTI greater than three STD to consider that 
episode as deep crisis or "crash". If the MTI is greater than two STD but less than three STD, 
we call it “mild crisis”. If MTI exceeds its mean value in a half STD at least twice the episode is 
considered “minor turbulence”. The remaining episodes, i.e. when the index departs less than 
one half standard deviation from the average are termed as “non- crisis” or tranquility times. In 
high inflation episodes (1976 and 1989), we excluded the data for the estimation of the 
moments, to avoid these data distort the moments. 
In order to determine the boundaries of a given crisis and so avoiding dating twice the same 
crisis, we require at least six months with no signals between each other. 
Table 1. Criteria to sort Crises 
Monthly Data 
Criteria 
Index # of Signals 
Classification 
MTI < 0.5 sMTI  Non- crisis 
0.5 sMTI<MTI< 2 sMTI Two close months Minor Turbulence  
2  sMTI <MTI < 3 sMTI Two close months  Mild 
MTI > 3 sMTI Two close months Deep 
 
The MTI was computed for five sub periods in order to keep its variance relatively 
homogeneous. Sub periods were chosen by political and economical historic events. 
Throughout its economic history Argentina suffered several episodes of high inflation and also 
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hyperinflation with the consequent impact on exchange rates and international reserves. So we 
treat those periods separately to avoid excluding crises episodes that could appear as 
tranquility times when compared with hyperinflation periods. The sub periods chosen were the 
following:  
(a) From Roca to the First World War: 1885-1913 
(b) The Interwar Period: 1914- 1945 
(c)  From Perón to Perón: 1946- 1976  
(d)  From Hyper to Hyper Inflation: 1976- 1991  
(e)  Convertibility: from boom to burst: 1992 – 2002 
It is worth remark that the terms “tranquility”, “minor turbulence”, “mild” and “deep” are referred 
to the sub period considered and is not intent to be an absolute qualification for the whole 
period. 
D ATA  
Considerably effort has been devoted on the construction of time series for 117 years. The 
market turbulence index was computed from monthly data from 1914 to the present. Exchange 
rates were taken from Vázquez- Presedo (1971 and 1975), Ámbito Financiero (1984) and FIEL. 
To construct the international reserves series we use data from Vázquez- Presedo (1971 and 
1975) Internat ional Monetary Fund and Banco Central de la República Argentina (BCRA). 
Interest rates were taken from Vázquez-Presedo (1971 and 1975), FIEL and BCRA. Monetary, 
fiscal and international trade variables were obtained from Cortés Conde (1989) and also from 
BCRA, Ministerio de Economía de la Nación, Vázquez-Presedo and from Gerchunoff and Llach 
(2003). Recent data of terms of trade as well as exports and imports comes from CEPAL.  
T HE  CL AS SI FI CA TI ON  O F CRI SE S 
We dated 19 crises throughout 117 years of history6. Five crises were rated as “deep”, nine as 
“mild” and five as “minor turbulence”. Interestingly, the number and magnitude of the crises 
increases through time (see Table 2). The four “deep crises” identified correspond to the years, 
1890-91, 1929-32, 1975-76, 1989-91 and 2001-02. 
                                                                                                                                                  
5 For the period 1980-1914 we used annual data 
6 Eichengreen and Bordo (2000) study dated crises years for more than 20 countries in the period 1885 – 1998. They 
found that Argentina had the poorest performance since it was the country that suffered more crises in the period.  
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Table 2. Crises Summary 
Type of crisis 
Period 
Years 
(1) 
Number 
of crises 
(2) 
Number of 
crises 
years (3) 
Crises Years 
as % of total 
years (3)/(1) 
GDP Growth 
(annual 
average in%) 
Deep Mild 
Minor 
Turbulence 
1885-
1913*  
28 2 3 10 5.4 1 1  
1914 - 
1945 32 4 7 22 3.1 1 1 2 
1946 – 
1976 
31 7 10 32 3.8 1 4 2 
1977 – 
1991 15 4 9 60 0.4 1 2 1 
1991- 
2003 11 2 3 27 2.1 1 1  
Total 117 19 26 23 3.3 5 9 5 
*We built the index for this period with annual data  
 
The 19 crises implied 26 crises years. That is, Argentina was 23% of its 117 years in crises, 
which meant one crisis year every 4.5 years. A given year is considered a crisis year if the 
market turbulence index exceeds one standard deviation from the average in at least 2 months 
consecutive or alternate. 
According to our index, the most turbulent period of Argentina’s history was 1977 –1991, not 
only because it registered 4 crises in 15 years, but also because nine of those years were crisis 
years, which meant 60% of these years in crisis (see Appendix, Table 2 A for details).  
V  MA CR OVA RI AB LES  BEH AVI OR  I N  T HE NE I GHB ORH OOD  O F TH E CR IS IS  
How did the Argentine economy perform in the neighborhood of crises? Is there any regularity 
in the behavior of the macroeconomic variables around these extreme episodes? Did the 
Argentine crises respond to the predictions of the first, second-generation or third generation 
currency crisis models? In order to approach answers we study significant differences in 
macroeconomic behavior during periods of crisis and periods of tranquility. Eichengreen et al 
(1994) found no significant differences for European countries but they found for emerging 
economies. As argued by Eichengreen et al (1994) if speculative attacks are caused by self 
fulfilling prophecies or simply by changes in expectation, there should be no significant 
differences in macro variables behavior during periods of speculative attacks and tranquility. 
But if we observe significant differences, the nature of these differences may reflect the 
inconsistent macroeconomic policies.  
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Differences in monetary and fiscal policy indicators during periods of crisis versus non crisis, 
may shed light on whether an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy may trigger speculative 
attack as in Krugman first generation model. 
On the other hand some internal or external indicator may give a sign that the cost of 
maintaining the peg is too high for the government, leading to a shift in expectations that may 
trigger a speculative attack, as in second generation model. For example a high rate of 
unemployment or a current imbalance as suggested by Obstfeld (1994) and Drazen and 
Masson (1994)  
We present a brief summary of the behavior of fiscal, monetary and external variables before, 
during and after “deep crisis”.  
Before crises.  
® With the sole exception of the 1929-32 crisis, the remaining “deep crises” had 
significant and persistent budget deficits in the years preceding each crisis episode. 
Remarkably, the years before de 1975-76 crisis show fiscal deficits around 8% of the 
GDP. Likewise, in the two years preceding the 1989-91 crisis, fiscal deficit averaged 
5.5% of the GDP. A closer look at the fiscal history of Argentina shows that deficits 
were the norm and surpluses very rare: only the years 1920, 1993 and 2002 (see 
Figure 1).  
® In all six “deep crises”, public expenditures as well as the real money aggregate M3 
grew at very high rates in the years preceding the crisis.  
® We also verify increases in the interest rates, worsening in trade and current account 
deficits and severe drainage of international reserves.  
· During Crises.  
® In the five cases for which we have GDP estimations, economic activity plunges and 
consequently imports diminish substantially, which in turn contributes to trade and 
current account adjustment.  
· After Crises.  
® After crisis, governments tighten fiscal accounts with a combination of fiscal revenue 
increment and public expenditure adjustment.  
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®  In the years following crisis we also register a strong recovery in economic activity, 
and hence in imports, and the return to current account deficit. 
 
Figure 1. Budget Deficit and Crises 1883 -2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gerchunoff and Llach (2003) and own calculations. 
 
V I EM P I RI CAL  R ES ULT S 
The empirical analysis has two parts. In the first one we compare the behavior of 
macroeconomic and external variables during crises using as control group the same variables 
but during non crises periods, following the Eichengreen et al (1994) and Frankel and Rose 
(1996) methodology. We cover a period that span from 1885 up to 2002 for Argentina. We 
present the mean and standard deviation of the series in appendix. There can be seen 
important differences between crises and non-crises samples. 
G RAP HI C ANA LY SI S 
Each of the graphics portrays the movement in a variable of interest beginning three years 
before the crisis until three years afterwards. As Frankel and Rose (1996) point out, a graphical 
approach has advantages and disadvantages. Among the first, a graphical analysis imposes no 
parametric structure on the data, makes only a few assumptions that are necessary in 
inference statistics, and they are often more accessible and informative than tables with 
estimations of coefficients. On the other hand, they are informal, and intrinsically univariate.   
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Real and Public Sector: we can clearly see differential behavior of series in the moment of the 
crisis and three periods before and after crisis. Public Expenditure growth reaches a maximum 
two periods before crisis, then decreases until one period before.  
Note: intervals of  u+-sigma 
Monetary series behave differently during crisis and in its neighborhood. Inflation peaks during 
the crisis, real M3 growth decreases considerably during crisis, while external debt peaks one 
year before crisis. 
External Sector: exports and imports reach a trough during crisis, however imports fall more 
than exports, leading to a surplus in trade balance. As most emerging countries, Argentina 
loses access to international capital market during crisis, so the current account improves 
during crisis.. 
 
 
 
 
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Inflation
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Real M3 Growth
-4000
-2000
0
2000
4000
6000
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Public External Debt (Changes)
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
GDP Growth
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Public Expenditure Growth
0
2
4
6
8
10
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP)
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation
 
17 
 
 
Before crisis we observe an appreciation of domestic currency, which is reverted during crisis.  
Terms of Trade peaks a period before crisis, which as we have already said, it let us think that 
in most severe crisis adverse external conditions were present . A similar behavior shows an 
international interest rate. This is an important for emerging economies for two reasons. The 
first one is pointed out by Calvo, Reinhart and Leiderman( 1992). They find that international 
rate of interest is a relevant factor for determine the capital inflow and outflow to emerging 
countries. The second one is related to the service of external debt: an increase in the rate of 
interest is associated with an increase in quasi fiscal deficit, worsening fiscal accounts.  
MTI and its components, as we expect since we use to sort crisis, behave differently during 
crisis than in the periods before and after. 
 
NON- PA RAM ETR I C TES TS  
Tables 3 and 4 contain several statistical non-parametric techniques that allow a more 
systematic comparison between episodes. The first group of tests, that include Wilcoxon, 
Median Chi-square, Kruskal-Wallis and van der Waerden, are test of equality of population. 
They have as null hypothesis the equality of sample median among groups. The statistics 
tabulated are values of these tests under the null, so small values lead us not to reject the null 
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of equality of population. Small probabilities value computed let us reject the null (one asterisk 
indicate values less than 5%, while double asterisk less than 1%). We reject the null for all 
series, excepting CA and TOT, for all the methods reported. 
Table 3. Panel A. Test of equality of population .  
Method GDP Public Expenditure 
Public 
Revenue* Inflation M3 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 3.8** 2.6** 3.6** 4.4** 2.6** 
Med. Chi-square 9.6** 2.8** 11.7** 11.7** 2.3** 
Kruskal-Wallis 14.5** 6.9** 13.1** 19.5** 6.8** 
van der Waerden 14.3** 7.0** 13.7** 21.6** 8.4** 
Note: ** p-value less than 1% 
 
Table 3. Panel B. Test of equality of population .  
Method Exports Imports CA/GDP TOT 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 2.51** 3.09** 0.91 1.87 
Med. Chi-square 10.25** 7.08** 0.94 3.05 
Kruskal-Wallis 6.31** 9.56** 0.83 3.53 
van der Waerden 7.06** 10.16** 0.71 3.01 
Note: ** p-value less than 1% 
We also tabulated the two-sample Kolmogorv-Smirnov test for equality of distributions. This test 
is also a non-parametric one, and just like in tests of equality of population, small values of 
probabilities lead us to reject the null. Values computed are reported in Table 4. 
According to the evidence presented, we are able to reject the null of equality of both 
population and distribution for the rate of change of public expenditure, income expenditure, 
M3, GDP, exports and imports (all in constant terms), and inflation. We are also able to reject 
the null for the rate of growth of exchange rate, reserves and the index. However this is not 
surprising since we are using these series as the criteria to determine crises versus non-crises 
episodes. We are unable to reject the null for CA and TOT, which is consistent with what we 
exposed before. 
Table 4. Panel A. Kolmogorov- Smirnov Test.  
 GDP* Public Expenditure * 
Public 
Revenue* Inflation M3* 
Kolmogorov Smirnov 0,45 0,32 0,44 0,51 0,51 
P-value 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Corrected 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
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Table 4. Panel B. Kolmogorov- Smirnov Test .  
 Exports* Imports* CA/GDP TOT 
Kolmogorov Smirnov 0,36 0,42 0,14 0,12 
P-value 0,01 0,00 0,71 0,88 
Corrected 0,00 0,00 0,63 0,83 
 
R EGR ES SI ON AN AL YSI S   
The graphical and non parametric studies are intrinsically univariate. Now we use regression 
analysis, estimating a logit model since our dependent variable is binary, 0 for no crises years, 
and 1 for crisis years. In order to improve the contrast of the sample, we include deep and mild 
crisis event.  
Among regressors we include 1) GDP growth, 2) public expenditure growth or fiscal deficit as 
% of GDP, 3) M3 growth, 4) real exchange rate overvaluation7, 5) current account deficit as % 
of GDP, 6) terms of trade and 7) international rate of interest, 8) reserves as % of imports and 
9) external debt.  
We estimate logit models using maximum likelihood8. Results are tabulated in Table 5. Since 
logit coefficient are not directly interpretable, we report the effect of a change in variables on 
the probability of crisis. We also tabulated z-statistics with null hypothesis of no effect. We also 
report McFadden R squared. 
All the variables included have the correct sign coefficients, and most of them are statistically 
significative. A decrease in GDP growth, in real M3 growth, in the ratio reserves to imports, an 
appreciation of the peso (lagged once), and impairing of TOT (while not significative at 
standard values) increase the probability of crisis.  
On the other hand an increase in public expenditure growth, in the current account deficit 
(lagged one period), in the external debt (not significative in Model 1), and an increase in the 
international rate of interest increase the probability of crisis.  
Interestingly enough, the results of the regression let us conclude that fiscal variables have an 
important role in determining the probability of crisis. The domestic macroeconomic effects, 
measured by GDP growth and real M3 growth are very strong. An appreciation of the currency 
(lagged once) also increases the probability of a crisis, but contemporaneously it has the 
opposite sign as expected, since during crisis devaluation has already taken place. However 
                                              
7 The degree of overvaluation of domestic currency is measured as the deviation from the trend 
8 We also estimated by probit and Linear Probability Model, but results do not differ significantly 
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we can also see that an impairing of external conditions (measured by an increase in 
international rate of interest or by a worsening in TOT) makes a crisis more probable. 
Table 6. Regression Results.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
C 
3.90 
(1.18) 
-0.93 
(-0.27) 
-0.85 
(0.25) 
GDP growth  
-0.17 
(-2.99) 
-0.17 
(-2.76) 
-0.17 
(2.76) 
Public expenditure growth 
0.05 
(2.55) 
0.04 
(2.29) 
0.04 
 
Real M3 growth 
-0.08 
(-2.79) 
-0.09 
(-2.60) 
-0.08 
(2.60) 
External Debt 
-6.05E-06 
(-0.06) 
1.45E-05 
(0.13) 
 
Terms of Trade (TOT) 
-0.06 
(-2.10) 
-0.03 
(-1.14) 
-0.03 
(-1.18) 
Current Account  Deficit  
-4.90 
(-0.78) 
-  
Current Account  Deficit  (-1)  
22.41 
(-2.39) 
-22.22 
(-2.41) 
LIBOR 
0.23 
(1.19) 
  
LIBOR (-1)  
0.56 
(2.37) 
0.55 
(2.36) 
Reserves /Imports 
-1.62 
(-2.13) 
-1.42 
(-2.07) 
-1.41 
(-2.04) 
Real Exchange Rate overvaluation  
0.41 
(2.51) 
0.44 
(2.59) 
0.44 
(2.60) 
Real Exchange Rate overvaluati on (-1) 
-0.47 
(-2.31) 
-0.48 
(-2.28) 
-0.48 
(-2.28) 
LR statistic (11 df) 52.67285 60.28001 60.26328 
Probability (LR stat) 8.56E-08 3.21E-09 1.19E-09 
    McFadden R-squared 0.42324 0.484366 0.484 
Obs with Dep=0 92 92 92 
Obs with Dep=1 26 26 26 
Note: Z statistic in parenthesis 
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I I I.  C ONC LU SI ON 
Alguna vez nos deja pensativos la sensación “de 
haber vivido ya ese momento”.  
Jorge Luis Borges,   
La doctrina de los ciclos. En Historia de la Eternidad. Emecé 
Editores Buenos Aires 1998. Página 109 
Since its independence, Argentina was involved in several crisis episodes. These episodes 
have been more frequent and deeper since 1930. Why crises are so frequent and of such large 
magnitude? What are these crises caused by? Do they always recognize the same causes? 
Why do governments, from different political parties, always get involved in large fiscal 
imbalances? What is the role of institutions?  
This paper, does not aim to answer all these questions, but is aiming at understanding best 
Argentinean crises.  
Firstly, we dated crises and classified them in “turbulent episodes”, “mild” and “deep”, by means 
of a Market Turbulence Index, defined as the weighed rate of change of exchange rate, 
reserves and interest rates, for the period 1885-2002.  
Secondly we perform parametric and non parametric analysis in order to determine whether the 
Argentinean crises respond to the predictions of first, second or third generation models.  
We analyzed the behavior of macroeconomic and financial variables in the neighborhood of 
crises. We split the sample in crises and non-crises years and carried out graphical analysis, 
and not parametric test. In graphical analysis we observe that the behavior of key variables, 
namely public expenditure, GDP, external debt, exports, imports and the current account deficit 
changes significantly before, during and after crises. 
We also report the two-sample Kolmogorv-Smirnov test of equality of distributions and the 
Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of population. We reject the null hypothesis of equal distribution 
and population.  
These studies are intrinsically univariate, so we also performed a regression analysis, 
estimating a logit model. The results of the regression let us conclude that fiscal variables have 
an important role in determining the probability of crisis. The domestic macroeconomic effects, 
measured by GDP growth and real M3 growth are very strong. An appreciation of the currency 
(lagged once) also increases the probability of a crisis. However we can also see that an 
impairing of external conditions make a crisis more probable. 
With all this evidence at hand, we might say that fiscal imbalances were the norm in the 
Argentinean economy during his 180 years as a nation. They were especially relevant at the 
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moment of explaining currency crisis. These let us say that crisis in Argentina share most of the 
characteristic of the first generation speculative attack models or a la Krugman. However we do 
not deny that elements of second and third generation models might be present as in Veigel 
(2004) and von Selzan (2003) for specific crises. But as far as we have studied, fiscal 
imbalances had a key role in explaining crisis. Our results seem to confirm Alberdi´s hypothesis 
that all the crises Argentina went through since its independence resembled each other and 
they were all driven by irresponsible fiscal policy, which in turn were caused by weak or lacking 
institutions.  
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Table 1 A.. Crises Characteristics: 1914 – 2002. Monthly Data 
Exchange Rate International Reserves  Interest Rate Crisis breath Market Turbulence Index  
Trough Peak Peak Trough Trough Peak 
Crisis 
$/U$S month $/U$S month 
Change 
% 
mm  month mm  month 
Change 
% % Month % Month 
Change 
% 
Beginin
g End 
# 
months I > 3 I > 2 
I > 
1.5 I > 1 
 
I > 
½ 
 
Crisis Type 
1914 2351 Mar-14 2368 May-14 -0.72 232.1 Apr 14 196.39 Jul-14 -15.39 7.50 Apr 14 8.75 Aug 14 16.7 May-14 Jul-14 3 0 2 0 0 1 Mild 
1920/21 2330 Apr 20 3454 Jul-21 -32.54 470.6 Jul-20 470.6 May-21 0.00 7.38 Oct-20 8.13 Apr 21 10.2 Jul-20 May-21 11 0 0 1 1 5 Turbulence 
1929/31 2375 Jan 29 4260 Oct-31 -44.25 502.6 Jan 29 256.9 Feb-32 -48.88 6.13 Dec  28 7.87 May-31 28.4 Mar-29 Dec 31 22 3 6 1 6 4 Deep 
1937/38 3291 Jun-37 3903 Apr 38 -15.68 476.4 Jun-37 343.1 apr 38 -27.99 5.14 Oct-37 5.75 Jan 39 11.9 Mar-37 Apr 38 14 0 0 0 4 5 Turbulence 
1948/49 475 Apr 48 1650 Nov-49 -71.21 3737 Feb-48 2067 Jul-49 -44.69           Mar-48 Nov-49 16 1 1 2 2 2 Mild 
1951 1374 Jun-50 2950 Sep-51 -53.42 2689 Dic-50 1866 Dic-51 -30.61           Jan 51 Aug 51 8 0 1 0 2 1 Turbulence 
1958 3720 Dec 57 7350 Oct-58 -49.39 461120 May-57 101270 Oct-58 -78.04           Jan 58 Oct-58 10 1 1 1 1 2 Mild 
1962 8420 dec 61 14840 Nov-62 -43.26 497765 Ago-61 120865 Oct-62 -75.72           jan 62 Oct-62 10 1 1 0 0 5 Mild 
1964 /65 14040 May-64 28570 Jul-65 -50.86 321365 May-64 117180 Jun-65 -63.54           Jun-64 Jun-65 13 0 1 2 0 5 Turbulence 
1971 41750 Feb-71 97750 Nov-71 -57.29 743825 Oct-71 194289 Jun-72 -73.88           Jun-71 Jul-72 14 0 2 2 2 3 Mild 
1975 /76 14 Jun-74 333.5 Mar-76 -95.80 1536531 May-74 293346 Aug 75 -80.91           Jul-74 Mar-76 21 2 4 2 5 2 Deep 
1981/82 1986.5 Dec 80 61568.2 Nov-82 -96.77 7343.891 Jul-80 
2425.13
6 
Nov-82 -66.98 4.31 Oct-80 10.82 Jul. 81 151.04 Dec 80 Nov-82 24 1 2 1 6 1 Mild 
1983/84/ 
85 
94650 May-83 9520454
.6 
Aug 85 -99.01 3244.84 Jan 82 973.53 Feb-85 -70.00 10.00 May-83 31.40 May-85 214.00 Jul-83 Apr 85 22 0 0 5 3 6 Turbulence 
1987 
8951.0
526 Jun-86 143100 Sep-88 -93.74 3718.56 May-86 958.39 Ago-87 -74.23 4.20 Jun-86 19.30 Jul-88 359.52 Aug 86 Jun-88 23 0 3 0 3 5 Mild 
1989/90/ 
91 
14310
0 
Sep-88 9879000
0 
May-91 -99.86 2652.47 Nov-88 898.91 Jan 90 -66.11 8.35 Sep-88 83.20 Jun-89 896.41 Jan 89 Feb-91 26 11 1 0 2 1 Deep 
1995 1 Dec 94 1 Mar-95 0.00 9967.07 Nov-94 5958.6 Apr 95 -40.22 0.60 Oct-94 1.50 Apr 95 150.00 Dec 94 Mar-95 4 0 2 2 0 0 Mild 
2001/02 1 May-01 3.69 Nov-02 -72.87 27547 Sep-00 9031 Oct-02 -67.22 0.58 Aug 00 4.86 Jul-02 737.93 Oct-00 Oct-02 25 9 1 1 2 4 Deep 
 
Note: the rate of growth of exchange rates and international reserves were computed from a peak to trough, considering the behavior of these variables six months before and after the signal given by the Market Turbulence 
Index announces the beginning and end of the crisis. 
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Table 1A. Panel A. Mean and Standard Deviation of Crises and non Crises Episodes.   
Growth Rate (%) 
  Parameter  
GDP 
Public 
Expenditure
* 
Public 
Revenue* 
Inflation M3/P 
Mean -0.5 -1.5 -2.9 237.7 -3.7 
Crises 
Standard Deviation 6,3 15.4 14.2 617.4 29.2 
Mean 5.0 8.1 8.5 15.0 12.4 
Non-crises 
Standard Deviation 7,6 20.6 15.8 36.4 27.9 
Mean 3,6 6.1 5.1 81.7 7.6 
Total 
Standard Deviation 7,8 21.6 16,1 352.3 29.1 
 
Table 1A. Panel B. Mean and Standard Deviation of Crises and non-Crises Episodes.  
Growth    Parameter  
Exports Imports 
Current 
Account/GDP 
Terms of Trade 
Mean -0.37 -3.68 -3.6 97.4 
Crises 
Standard Deviation 20,31 29,87 6.9 17.8 
Mean 10,84 13,14 -2.3 102.0 Non-crises 
 Standard Deviation 19,67 27,82 5.4 17.6 
Mean 7.0 7.58 -2.7 100,5 
Total 
Standard Deviation 20.52 29.12 5.9 17,7 
 
